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MALADIES IN THE MISINFORMATION
MARKETPLACE
Emily A. Thorson∗ & Stephan Stohler†
ABSTRACT
The marketplace of ideas theory of the First Amendment's Free
Speech Clause holds that good ideas will win out over inferior
competitors if competition is uninhibited. Although seductive,
this theory rests on several problematic assumptions, including
one thus far not considered. The theory assumes that participants
in the marketplace are able to discard bad or false ideas without
those ideas impacting participants' attitudes. Experimental
evidence suggests that this assumption is false: the attitudinal
effects of misinformation can linger even after a person
recognizes the misinformation to be false. This Article explores
the legal implications of this empirical finding, concluding that
the marketplace of ideas theory is an ill-suited theory for
determining when misinformation deserves constitutional
protection. We argue instead that political misinformation
should be evaluated in terms of how it affects citizens' ability to
connect their values to their political participation. Only when
political misinformation substantially interferes with political
participation, thereby threatening individuals' democratic
competence, should courts begin to consider whether
government regulation is appropriate.
INTRODUCTION
False information and fake news repeatedly dominated
news coverage of the 2016 presidential election. One of the most
extreme examples, commonly referred to as “PizzaGate,”
involved a conspiracy theory linking the Democratic Party's
presidential nominee, Hillary Clinton, to a sex-trafficking ring
managed from a pizza restaurant in Washington, D.C. The
rumor, which first emerged in online communities and soon
spread more widely, came to a dramatic head when Edgar
Maddison Welch took matters into his own hands. Welch, a
resident of North Carolina, made a special trip to Washington,
D.C. to investigate the story. But when restaurant employees
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prevented Welch from entering restricted parts of the restaurant,
Welch produced a rifle and fired shots inside the pizzeria.1
Misinformation like this has generated substantial
concern among journalists, politicians, and the public more
generally. While the PizzaGate rumor circulated mainly in
online communities, other misinformation has reached more
mainstream audiences. Indeed, some fake news stories generated
more social media traffic than prominent mainstream news
articles during the 2016 election.2 In October 2017, Congress
held hearings to better understand the extent to which Russian
propaganda, including misinformation, could have interfered
with the 2016 election.3 Representative surveys also show a
growing public concern about the existence of misinformation in
the information news ecosystem. Sixty-four percent of U.S.
adults indicated that fake news has caused a “great deal of
confusion” about the basic facts of current events.4
In the face of this public consternation over
misinformation, new questions have emerged about whether and
under what circumstances authorities can regulate the spread of
misinformation in ways that are consistent with the First
Amendment. The potentially negative effects of misinformation
seemingly warrant greater regulation when viewed through the
lens of the prominent “marketplace of ideas” theory of free
speech. In this Article, we examine the utility of the marketplace
of ideas theory for deciding when regulation of political
misinformation is appropriate. In particular, we focus on “belief
echoes” in the marketplace of ideas. Belief echoes are lingering
attitudinal effects of misinformation that persist even after
misinformation is successfully corrected.5 The existence of belief
echoes suggests that the effects of false information may have
greater negative consequences for the marketplace of ideas than
1

Eric Lipton, Man Motivated by ‘Pizzagate’ Conspiracy Theory Arrested in Washington
Gunfire, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/05/us/pizzagate-comet-ping-pong-edgarmaddison-welch.html.
2
Craig Silverman, This Analysis Shows How Viral Fake Election News Stories
Outperformed Real News On Facebook, BUZZFEED (Nov. 16, 2016, 5:15 PM),
https://www.buzzfeed.com/craigsilverman/viral-fake-election-news-outperformedreal-news-on-facebook.
3
April Glaser, Twitter Could Do a Lot More to Curb the Spread of Russian Misinformation,
SLATE (Oct. 2, 2017, 3:02 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2017/10/twitter_could_do
_more_to_stop_its_russian_bot_problem_and_defend_democracy.html.
4
Michael Barthel, Amy Mitchell, & Jesse Holcomb, Many Americans Believe Fake
News Is Sowing Confusion, PEW RESEARCH CTR. 1, 3 (Dec. 2016),
http://assets.pewresearch.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/13/2016/12/14154753/PJ_2016.12.15_fakenews_FINAL.pdf.
5
Emily A. Thorson, Belief Echoes: The Persistent Effects of Corrected Misinformation, 33
POL. COMM. 460 (2016).
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previously thought. Exposure to false information, even if it is
successfully corrected, can have lingering downstream effects on
political attitudes. Simply put, even if a person consciously
recognizes that a piece of information is false, the incorrect
information can alter her attitudes toward a political candidate
or policy. Belief echoes seemingly interfere with the operation of
the marketplace of ideas because individuals are unable to
wholly divorce themselves of bad ideas in favor of their superior
competitors. As such, belief echoes constitute a breakdown of the
marketplace of ideas, which courts have traditionally used as a
justification supporting government regulation of speech.
We argue that although belief echoes pose serious
problems for the marketplace of ideas, they do not necessarily
justify regulation. Rather, their existence highlights the
inadequacy of the marketplace of ideas theory for assessing the
consequences of political misinformation. We argue instead that
in the realm of politics, one potential standard for judging
whether misinformation requires intervention is whether it
affects democratic competence, or the ability of citizens to connect
their values to their political participation. Using this standard,
we find that even misinformation which creates belief echoes
does not necessarily threaten democratic competence and,
therefore, does not warrant regulation consistent with the First
Amendment.
I. MISINFORMATION IN THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS
Before we examine belief echoes and the ways that
misinformation may have lingering effects on citizens' attitudes,
it is useful to review the marketplace of ideas and how the courts
have used this theory to warrant regulation and punishment of
speech in some cases but not others.
A. The Marketplace of Ideas
The marketplace of ideas theory of the First Amendment
holds that good ideas will win out over inferior competitors in
unconstrained competition.6 Governments, the theory suggests,
should therefore be reluctant to interfere with speech unless and
until the speech itself undermines the desired results of free
competition.
This view of the First Amendment is perhaps most closely
associated with progressive-era constitutional reformers, like
6

The Supreme Court has not elaborated a robust statement of the marketplace of
ideas theory. For a more precise version, see C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY
AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 6-24 (1989). Baker, however, did not advocate the
marketplace of ideas theory.
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Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis Brandeis, who had
grown uncomfortable with the implications of existing doctrinal
positions that readily supported government suppression of
unpopular ideas.7 Indeed, Justice Holmes himself had
contributed to early doctrinal interpretations which readily
supported government punishment of speech. In Schenck v.
United States,8 for example, Justice Holmes held that the
“question in every case [was] whether the words used [were]
used in such circumstances and [were] of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they [would] bring about
the substantive evils that Congress [had] a right to prevent.”9
This original formulation of the clear and present danger test,
governing advocacy of illegal action, seemingly relied on a
theory that the effects of speech should be punished just like any
other actions taken in pursuit of an inchoate crime. If those
actions—or in this case speech—tended to contribute to the
realization of the crime, then government actions to counter
unlawful behavior were in order.
But some of the Court's progressives grew uncomfortable
with the implications of this approach.10 In a series of cases, these
justices developed an alternative interpretation.11 Instead of
allowing governments to punish speech, which had the tendency
to produce lawless action, these justices proposed a clever
alternative. Governments could not interfere with such speech
unless and until time had run out for would-be criminals to
change their minds. Only after this point-of-no-return could
proponents of illegal action be punished for their speech. While
Justice Brennan did not invoke the conception of the
marketplace explicitly in Brandenburg v. Ohio,12 the Court's
7

THOMAS HEALY, THE GREAT DISSENT: HOW OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES CHANGED
HIS MIND AND CHANGED THE HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA 187–97 (2013);
G. Edward White, Justice Holmes and the Modernization of Free Speech Jurisprudence: The
Human Dimension, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 391 (1992).
8
249 U.S. 47 (1919).
9
Id. at 52.
10
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“To allow
opposition by speech seems to indicate that you think the speech impotent, as when a
man says that he has squared the circle, or that you do not care whole heartedly for
the result, or that you doubt either your power or your premises. But when men have
realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even
more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate
good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that
truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at
any rate is the theory of our Constitution.”); HEALY, supra note 7, passim (chronicling
the evolution of Justice Holmes’ thinking about free expression and how it should be
handled by the Court).
11
See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring);
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
12
395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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conclusion in that case is entirely consistent with a marketplace
theory.13 The Court has largely remained committed to this view,
with only one recent exception.14
The marketplace theory was adopted to solve a particular
problem, namely how to resist the inclination to punish speech
that advocated violence or illegal action. But, perhaps because of
its normative appeal, judges and scholars have applied the theory
to other legal problems as well. For example, although judicial
opponents of campaign finance restrictions have not always
signaled their reliance on the marketplace theory explicitly, their
decisions again seem consistent with such interpretative
understandings. In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,15 Justice
Lewis Powell seemed to have something similar in mind when
he struck down expenditure limits impacting a Massachusetts
referendum.16 In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,17 the
Court's justices seemingly pitted competing theories of the First
Amendment against one another, with conservatives favoring
competition free from government interference while liberals
favored a view stressing personal liberty.18 Dissenters were more
explicit in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission,19 referring to
the marketplace metaphor directly.20
In each of these cases, the marketplace of ideas was used
to support decisions that either did or would have struck down a
statute that placed restrictions on political expenditures. The
argument, generally speaking, was that governments should not
be allowed to interfere with the speech of natural or corporate
persons, seeking to influence election outcomes absent market
breakdowns, because such interference simply resulted in
governments favoring some speech over others. If, as these
13

Id. at 447 (“[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not
permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation
except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”).
14
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 8 (2010) (upholding a provision
of the USA PATRIOT Act that prohibited material support to foreign terrorist
organizations, including support for training to resolve conflicts peacefully).
15
435 U.S. 765 (1978).
16
Id. at 777 (“The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing
the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation,
association, union, or individual.”).
17
494 U.S. 652, 680 (1990).
18
Id. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (declaring “the absolutely central truth of the First
Amendment: that government cannot be trusted to assure, through censorship, the
‘fairness' of political debate.”).
19
540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
20
Id. at 248–49 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 265 (Thomas, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (“The ‘very purpose of the First Amendment [is] to preserve an
uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail.’” (citing Red
Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969))); see also FEC v. Mass. Citizens
for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986).
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opinions presume, the First Amendment protects a true
marketplace of ideas, then the marketplace will regulate itself.
This conception of a marketplace of ideas rests on the
notion that individuals can liberate themselves of the lingering
effects that false information has on attitudes. But, as we discuss
subsequently, this may not be true. Rather, misinformation can
create residual “belief echoes” that affect attitudes even if
participants in the marketplace ultimately accept the corrected
information as true.
B. Misinformation and Belief Echoes
Any attempt to understand, study, and regulate fake news
and misinformation must wrestle with basic definitional issues
about how to identify and differentiate among potentially
contested claims about the world. We avoid rehearsing this
debate here and instead proceed by adopting a common-sense
definition of information in order to address the legal question of
when misinformation can be regulated consistent with the First
Amendment. We assert that correct information must accurately
represent or correspond with phenomena that lie beyond our
subjective experiences. Misinformation, on the other hand,
misrepresents the real world.
In the world of politics, this seemingly simple definition
is complicated by several factors. First, much of the information
considered important to political decision making is not entirely
subject to independent verification or falsification. For example,
few are in a position to adjudicate a claim that the Affordable
Care Act will reduce health care costs by fifteen percent in 2020,
or a claim that Hillary Clinton’s “true beliefs” about abortion are
different from her public statements.
In addition, unlike facts about easily observable
phenomena, many key pieces of political information are
mediated.21 Economic data are collected through the
Congressional Budget Office; hour-long speeches are
summarized in brief articles; policies are reduced to talking
points. The decisions made by institutions, journalists, and
politicians about how to communicate political information to
the public are not made at random but are themselves shaped by
the political environment. James Kuklinski and his colleagues
emphasize this point when they argue that “the criteria for and

21

WALTER LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION 25 (1946) (“We shall assume that what each
man does is based not on direct and certain knowledge, but on pictures made by
himself or given to him.”).
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relevance of political facts are determined within, not outside,
politics.”22
These difficulties should not be ignored, but rather built
into our understanding of how misinformation can affect
attitudes. Political facts are often both contested and contestable.
However, an acknowledgment of relativity should not be taken
as an abandonment of the goal of objectivity. Any given piece of
information resides somewhere on the spectrum from falsifiable
to unfalsifiable. Here we restrict our focus to factual assertions
that fall on the more objective side of this spectrum and are still
relevant to political decision-making. For example, we can
determine with relative, though not complete, certainty whether
a candidate accepted campaign donations from a criminal;
whether Barack Obama was born in the United States; or
whether infant mortality rates rose in a particular state during a
particular time frame. While these claims might not be as clearcut as an assertion about what type of cheese John Kerry ordered
on his cheese steak, they are more verifiable than a claim about
how John Kerry's economic plan will benefit the middle class.
Efforts to correct misinformation are driven by concerns
over the consequences of a misinformed citizenry. Insofar as
attitudes are based on factual knowledge, citizens who possess
inaccurate information may form opinions that differ
substantially from the opinions they would have formed were
they correctly informed. The emphasis on fact-checking in
today's media environment is aimed at preventing these
problems, thereby moving us closer to the idealized marketplace
of ideas.23 Social media, the proliferation of independent and
decentralized blogs, and the 24-hour news cycle all increase
citizens' access to a greater quantity of information. Some of this
information may indeed be misleading, but it is also the case that
factual claims often encounter widespread and decentralized
scrutiny in ways that resemble the idealized and stylized
marketplace of ideas.
But the marketplace of ideas makes a critical assumption
that has largely gone unexamined. After individuals discard
information that is shown to be false, the theory assumes, false
information will cease to affect attitudes. In other words, reading
a correction should cause attitudes initially affected by false
claims to revert back to their pre-exposure state. This assumption
must be true according to the marketplace of ideas because
22

James H. Kuklinski et al., “Just the Facts, Ma'am:” Political Facts and Public Opinion,
560 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 143, 147 (1998).
23
LUCAS GRAVES, DECIDING WHAT'S TRUE: THE RISE OF POLITICAL FACTCHECKING IN AMERICAN JOURNALISM 10 (2016) (Fact-checkers “try to balance the
daily realities of highly partisan, often vicious discourse online with their formal
commitment to inform a reasoning democratic public”).
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otherwise individuals might be left worse-off—or at least change
their minds about political matters in ways that are not supported
by factual information—by participating in the marketplace of
ideas. Such results would run counter to the promised end state
of greater awareness, if not truth.
There are reasons to be skeptical, however, that
corrections—even if they succeed at correcting false beliefs—can
also be entirely successful at erasing any attitudinal change
caused by the initial exposure to misinformation. Rather,
exposure to misinformation can create “belief echoes:” lingering
attitudinal effects that persist even after a piece of
misinformation is successfully corrected.24 In a series of
experiments employing realistic political scenarios, individuals'
attitudes were affected by exposure to misinformation despite
recognizing that the misinformation was false.25 In one of these
experiments, individuals were randomly assigned into one of
three different groups and asked to read a news article containing
a piece of misinformation about a candidate, which was
subsequently corrected. A second group read the same article
without the correction. A third saw neither the misinformation
nor the correction. The correction was fully successful at
eliminating participants' belief in the misinformation. In other
words, the marketplace of ideas “worked” in that the correction
erased belief in the misinformation. However, when it came to
attitudes, the correction was less successful. People who saw the
misinformation evaluated the candidate more negatively than
those who did not, despite consciously knowing that the
information was not true. Thus, exposure to political
misinformation has the potential to create belief echoes:
attitudinal shifts that persist even after individuals abandon their
commitment to incorrect information.
The existence of belief echoes suggests that even when the
marketplace of ideas operates efficiently to correct false claims,
misinformation can still shape citizens' attitudes, challenging the
basic mechanism through which the marketplace of ideas
purportedly operates. Individuals, according to the theory,
should be able to participate in the marketplace and discard
inferior arguments without collateral consequences on their
political attitudes. But, if misinformation has lingering effects on
those attitudes, then individuals who participate in the
metaphorical marketplace may change their minds not because
they are persuaded by superior arguments, but because of their
declining support for candidates or policies. This is not a market
failure so much as a violation of the basic assumptions of the
24
25

Thorson, supra note 5.
Id.

2018]

MISINFORMATION MARKETPLACE

450

theory. This distinction is important because metaphorical
market failures have been held to support restriction of speech.26
When the market fails because the theory rests on false
assumptions, however, then speech restrictions may not be
warranted. Rather, the failure indicates a larger problem, raising
concerns that the theory might be misapplied in ways that restrict
otherwise constitutionally protected speech.
The Supreme Court has exhibited two approaches to false
speech. While it has repeatedly demonstrated some reluctance to
offer outright protection for false speech because of its low value,
the Court has nonetheless recognized that false statements are
inevitable in free debate.27 Indeed, the Court has often tolerated
false statements because it has feared that any prohibitions on
false speech could have a so-called “chilling effect” on otherwise
permissible speech that might discourage a free exchange of
ideas.28 But misinformation that has the capacity to create belief
echoes seems to fall outside of the scope of this limited approach.
Belief echoes describe how misinformation shapes citizens'
evaluations of political objects (including candidates, policies,
and groups). While under some circumstances, these evaluations
may also alter individuals' political behavior (for example,
voting), this is only rarely the case. Indeed, substantial empirical
research shows that in the realm of politics, it is remarkably
difficult for any single piece of information (or misinformation)
to alter behavior, because individuals' pre-existing attitudes (in
particular, partisanship) exert a strong effect on what they attend
to, recall, and use to inform their political decision making.29 Put
another way, even if misinformation affects a person's attitudes,
such consequences are not necessarily sufficient to shape her
behavior. However, the marketplace of ideas theory of free
speech simply does not have the nuance to recognize this
important distinction between attitudes and behavior. This
failure points to the benefits of employing a different approach
for deciding when misinformation should be regulated consistent
with the First Amendment.

26

See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (“[U]nless they so imminently
threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that
an immediate check is required to save the country.”).
27
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964).
28
Id. at 300.
29
See generally MILTON LODGE & CHARLES S. TABER, THE RATIONALIZING VOTER
(2013).
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II. DEMOCRATIC COMPETENCE AS AN ALTERNATIVE
APPROACH
Most scholars agree that citizens' knowledge is a
cornerstone of a functioning democracy, but disagreement
persists about what exactly citizens need to know for democracy
to function properly.30 The prevalence of misinformation in
electoral politics has only made this debate more urgent. One
potentially fruitful approach, with important implications for
legal debates over speech regulation, focuses on the relationship
between citizens' knowledge and democratic competence.31
Arthur Lupia argues that any given piece of information matters
for democratic functioning insofar as it allows citizens to
transform their values into concrete political action. For
example, a person who is deeply concerned about rising health
insurance costs might require information about the candidates'
health plans to address this issue in order to connect her values
(health care) to her actions (vote choice). This particular piece of
information would increase her competence in a way that
information about the candidates' stance on abortion might not.
We argue that this standard of competence is also
relevant for assessing the effects of misinformation and can also
establish a baseline for determining whether and under what
circumstances misinformation can be regulated. According to
this standard of competence, not all misinformation is
necessarily problematic. Rather, only misinformation that
directly threatens citizens' ability to connect their values to
political action should be excluded from First Amendment
protection.
An illustration may be useful here. Misinformation often
appears in the context of elections. But misinformation is
particularly problematic when it relates to deceptive election
practices. A classic, if not common, example of such deceptive
practices, Richard Hasen recalls, “is a flyer distributed in
African-American neighborhoods claiming that Democrats are
allowed to vote on Wednesday, not Election Day Tuesday.”32
Elections rarely occur on Wednesdays in the United States. By
missing election day, those who would rely on this information
30

See, e.g., Cheryl Boudreau and Arthur Lupia, Political Knowledge, in CAMBRIDGE
HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL POLITICAL SCIENCE 171 (James N. Druckman et al.
eds., 2011) (“Some scholars raised questions about the practice of basing broad
generalizations of citizen competence or knowledge on a relatively small set of
idiosyncratic, fact-based survey questions.”)
31
For elaboration on this approach, see ARTHUR LUPIA, UNINFORMED: WHY PEOPLE
KNOW SO LITTLE ABOUT POLITICS AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT (2016).
32
RICHARD L. HASEN, VOTING WARS: FROM FLORIDA 2000 TO THE NEXT ELECTION
MELTDOWN 78 (2012).
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would necessarily be deprived of translating their political
attitudes into meaningful political action and thereby falling
short of the competence standard. Such misinformation would
rightly be subject to regulation consistent with the First
Amendment.
But, as indicated, not all misinformation runs afoul of this
democratic competence standard. In another example, Hasen
considers an advertisement paid for by Latinos for Reform
encouraging Spanish-speaking voters abstain from voting in an
upcoming election essentially to punish Democratic leaders for
not acting sufficiently on immigration reform.33 The primary
funders of the sponsoring organization, however, did not appear
to be Latino. Instead, they were closely associated conservative
causes and therefore would have benefited from low Hispanic
turnout because Hispanic voters have recently tended to vote
against conservative candidates. But, unlike the classic example
of deceptive election practices, the information in this
advertisement did not interfere with the capacity of the targeted
citizens to cast a ballot. It simply provided them with an
alternative strategy to pursue their preferred outcomes.
Accordingly, they could still translate their political attitudes into
political action in meaningful ways.
Similarly, when evaluated by the standard of
competence, the effect that misinformation like PizzaGate and
other examples had on the outcome of the presidential election
may be minimal because most of the people who consumed fake
news used it to reinforce their pre-existing beliefs.34 Just as
opponents of Hillary Clinton were far more likely to encounter
and believe news stories about PizzaGate, those who disliked
Donald Trump were more likely to encounter and accept
misinformation about him. It seems unlikely, therefore, that this
misinformation interfered with the capacity of voters to connect
their values with appropriate political participation.
III. CONCLUSION
The marketplace of ideas theory of the First Amendment
identified government action as a primary threat to the free

33

Id. at 75–79.
Andrew Guess, Brendan Nyhan, & Jason Reifler, Selective Exposure to
Misinformation: Evidence From the Consumption of Fake News During the 2016 U.S.
Presidential Campaign, EUROPEAN RESEARCH COUNCIL (Jan. 9, 2018),
http://www.dartmouth.edu/~nyhan/fake-news-2016.pdf; Amanda Taub, The Real
Story About Fake News Is Partisanship, N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (Jan. 11, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/11/upshot/the-real-story-about-fake-news-ispartisanship.html?mcubz=3.
34
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exchange of ideas.35 But, as we have argued here, this classical
approach rests on a set of psychological assumptions about how
individuals process and store factual political information. New
empirical research, discussed here, indicates that even factual
information has an affective component that colors our
understanding of the political world. While we may be able to
part ways with the content of political misinformation, the
affective dimension of such misinformation may often linger in
ways that work against the promises of the marketplace of ideas.
But the existence of belief echoes should not support
broad efforts to regulate political misinformation. Rather, as we
outline in this Article, government efforts to regulate
misinformation should only be allowed under the First
Amendment when such regulation enables democratic
competence and facilitates citizens' capacity to translate their
values into political action. While this recommendation departs
from the classical First Amendment model, which has been
skeptical of any government interference, regulator efforts that
enhance democratic competence do not pose the same risks as
other types of intervention.

35

SAM LEBOVIC, FREE SPEECH AND UNFREE NEWS: THE PARADOX OF PRESS
FREEDOM IN AMERICA 18 (2016).

